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Abstract  
 
Since military units often require critical hazardous materials in an expedited 
manner, identifying choke points within the supply chain is necessary to improve logistic 
support to front line forces.  Hazardous materials are some of the most critical assets for 
the war fighter, as well as the most restrictive and often most time consuming for 
transportation. 
  This research quantifies the extent that vendor and depot supplied cargo is being 
delayed at Aerial Ports of Embarkation.  By looking at frustrated hazardous material at 
Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina and Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, a case 
study methodology is used to determine the top causes of frustrated HAZMAT cargo, the 
average time shipments were frustrated and determines the vendor these shipments are 
coming from.  Data include documented frustrated cargo over a four month period in 
2005 at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base and highlight trends.  The results and 
analysis of this research compare the frustrated cargo record at these bases as well as pin 
pointing specific trends from the vendors that provide the cargo. 
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HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CARGO FRUSTRATED AT MILITARY AERIAL 
PORTS OF EMBARKATION 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
1.1. Background 
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) estimates over 800,000 Hazardous 
Material (HAZMAT) shipments occur each day and 1.5 billion tons of HAZMAT is 
moved each year. (Luedtke, 2002).  HAZMAT by definition is “Material that exposes one 
to risk” and this material can be found in all aspects of the military (Webster, 2004).   
Bombs, bullets, oil, batteries, liquid oxygen, gasoline and paint are all examples of 
HAZMAT that require extra care when handling.  The transportation of hazardous cargo 
is a continuous challenge that requires extreme caution to ensure proper training, safety 
requirements and security precautions are taken into account.  HAZMAT as it relates to 
the military represents a critical piece of material that allows any combat or cargo 
movement to take place.    
  
1.2. Problem 
Air Mobility Command (AMC) continues to see Hazardous Material, destined to 
support overseas operations, being unprepared for flight or “frustrated” at the major 
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deployment locations.  In general, HAZMAT transportation requires extra restrictions, 
care and training when being moved with a forklift or truck.  When HAZMAT is 
transported by air, an even greater requirement exists for packaging, handling and paper 
work requirements.  Currently, the Air Force has four major airlift hubs or Aerial Ports of 
Embarkation (APOE).  These locations provide a meeting point or cargo collection place 
for ground and air cargo transportation.  Cargo that is purchased by the United States to 
support the war fighter overseas is delivered by truck or mail to these four major 
locations so that it can be loaded on cargo aircraft and delivered to the intended final 
destination.   According to headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC) cargo 
management branch website, 170 items of cargo scheduled for air transportation by AMC 
are frustrated right now world wide. (AMC, Jan 2006).  This number represents only a 
sample of critical HAZMAT stuck in transition that is vital to the troops and the mission.  
How to reduce or eliminate frustrated HAZMAT at the APOEs is the primary problem 
studied by this research. 
 
1.3. Previous Research 
Previous research by Ellison studied this problem and very little previous research 
had been done prior to her effort. (Ellison, 2004)  The findings in Ellison’s research left a 
great deal of potential for further analysis and study.  Ellison’s research identified 
communication problems between the vendor (depot and commercial supplier) and the 
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE).  Her research also showed that communication and 
supply requirement problems existed between the user in the field and the supplier back 
home.  Additionally, purchases the Government Purchase Card program was often the 
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method for ordering the required cargo for the user.  However, very limited 
communication between the supplier and the aerial ports was identified as a cause for 
frustrated shipments and or double orders.  The research conducted by Ellison began the 
first step to identify why HAZMAT cargo was frustrated at the aerial ports and began an 
effort to look at what could be done by APOEs and commercial carriers to make cargo 
more air worthy.    
 
1.4. Research Question 
The scope of this research is to look at the aerial port cargo operations directly 
and determine what problem areas impede the delivery of HAZMAT.  The following is 
the over arching research question that is focused on throughout this study:   
What are the current reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston 
AFBs and what improvements can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that 
will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft? 
To analyze the research question more specifically, the investigative questions in 
the next section ask about the specific components of the shipping process that is 
analyzed in this study.  
 
1.5. Investigative Questions 
To answer the main problem of this research, the following investigative 
questions have been formulated for this study.  First, since the data for this study is made 
from two different Air Force Bases, question one looks at how the Customer Service 
operations vary.  It asks:  What are the major differences between the Customer Service 
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Operations at Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the 
transport of HAZMAT? 
The next question looks at one category of HAZMAT and focuses on frustrated 
cargo that comes from the major Air Force depots.  The following is question two:  What 
are common causes for depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB? 
Question three looks closer at depot frustrated cargo by analyzing how long depot 
cargo is prevented from being transported to the war fighter.  The following is question 
three:  What is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo? 
The next question identifies the trends that can be seen over time to see if any 
current improvements are being made.  By analyzing the current published metrics, 
question four determines if the HAZMAT frustration problem is improving or getting 
worse.  It asks:  What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT performance 
metrics at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB? 
Question five is perhaps the most important question of the research, and it looks 
closely at HAZMAT coming from vendors.  The research compares the causes of 
frustrated HAZMAT cargo to the vendor that supplied it.  The following is question five 
of the investigative questions:  What trends can be identified when cross referencing 
reasons for frustrated HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?   
These secondary questions support investigative question five: 
A. What reasons primarily cause vendor supplied HAZMAT to be frustrated? 
B. What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT? 
 
5 
In addition to these investigative questions, this research also looks at how the 
current results compare to the data collected by Ellison in 2004.  Difference between 
current data and Ellison’s data are identified and where possible the causes are also 
identified. 
 
1.6. Research Methodology 
The research looks closer at the frustrated HAZMAT problem and identifies key 
components that slow down the cargo delivery process.  By looking at each investigative 
question, a foundation can be expanded upon to improve the supply chain process that is 
slowing down the delivery of HAZMAT cargo.   
Frustrated HAZMAT cargo at the key mobility hubs of Dover and Charleston Air 
Force Base (AFB) are looked at very closely in this study.  The research is also taken a 
step further by analyzing the vendor’s specific track record at each of these locations.  
More specifically, this research looks at the common reasons, length of delay and 
frequency of HAZMAT frustrations at Charleston and Dover AFB.  In addition, this 
research project looks at how the bases fix the frustrated items and how long this process 
takes.  
This research also looks at the current causes for frustrated cargo and expands on 
previous research.  Additionally, comparisons were made between two AMC bases to 
look at the different ways frustrated HAZMAT is handled.  By flagging reoccurring 
problems, improving the process and using suppliers that provide air worthy cargo an 
opportunity to decrease HAZMAT frustrations may be achieved. 
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1.6.1. Data and Analysis 
Data come directly from Dover and Charleston AFB and identify the source of 
incoming frustrated HAZMAT from state-side suppliers.   All frustrated HAZMAT 
occurrences during a four month period of time consisting of over 400 frustrated items is 
analyzed to see where it came from and to see if trends exist on how this cargo is 
prepared.  Statistical analysis on frustrated cargo is conducted during the research and a 
Chi Square analysis between commercial vendor and reason for delay is completed.  By 
collecting this data and analyzing it in a statistical model, trends are identified to 
determine what vendors are demonstrating problems and which type of cargo results in 
the longest delay.  In addition, by directly contacting officials at Dover and Charleston 
AFB, supplementary data was collected.  Visits of each base helped identify the 
HAZMAT processes and helped to accomplish comparisons.    These site visits allowed 
the researcher to interview key personnel who run the transportation operations and get 
first hand insight to the HAZMAT frustration problems that are perceived. 
 
1.7. Scope and Limitations of the Research    
Much of the research is limited to the specific problems or issues at the time the 
research was conducted.   This may seem intuitive but the requirements and type of cargo 
moved from one month to the next vary greatly.  From a statistical point of view, it would 
be easy to say that having over 400 data points is sufficient for proper research.  
However, as the research shows, data collected from one year to the next, and from one 
month to the next, seems to change dramatically based on the requirements and types of 
7 
cargo being deployed.  The scope of this research only analyzes a four month window 
during 2005.    
The same limitations apply to this research that have been seen in Ellison’s 
previous research.  “The necessity of the item are not studied. They are assumed to be 
valid requirements.” (Ellison, 2004) This same assessment applies to this research also.  
Additionally, the research only looks at the cargo that comes through the APOEs of 
interest.    HAZMAT shipments have been studied at Charleston and Dover AFB.  No 
other AMC APOEs have been looked at and these bases act as a representative of cargo 
being shipped out of C-17 and C-5 APOEs, respectively.   
Commercial suppliers and commercial transportation services have been analyzed 
based on those having problems providing airworthy cargo.  The scope is limited to those 
suppliers causing the frustration and a look at their process to improve delivery of 
HAZMAT.   The research does not show what portion of the cargo coming from each 
vendor was frustrated, and the research only shows the frequency of shipments that a 
vendor is the source of the frustrated cargo in question. 
Finally, the cause of the frustration may not be because of anything the vendor or 
depot did wrong.  The cargo may have been shipped from the vendor or depot air worthy 
but due to circumstance while in transit or in holding at the APOE, something happened 
to the cargo or the documentation.  This research does not study frustrations caused 
because of errors during transportation to the APOE. 
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1.8. Summary    
Our forces that are overseas in combat fighting and dying for their country need 
the required tools to accomplish the mission and to save their lives.  HAZMAT items are 
some of the most critical assets required for our soldiers and the most strictly regulated 
for air transportation.   Finding solutions that continue to decrease the existing delays for 
HAZMAT to depart on AMC aircraft is absolutely vital.  Only by analyzing specific 
details of the process can time, man-hours and money be saved and our troops be 
properly re-supplied and equipped.    
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II. Literature Review 
 
  
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This Chapter reviews the literature on HAZMAT and frustrated cargo that has 
been done before this study.  The review focuses on studies that deal with causes of delay 
and analysis of the process.  A look at some of the systems in place to track frustrated 
HAZMAT is reviewed and provides some of the data in this research project.  The 
transportation HAZMAT specialists from Dover and Charleston provided valuable 
insight as to how the process was being conducted.  
To gain a better understanding of HAZMAT delivery process from ordering to 
departure of aircraft from CONUS APOEs, a review of Department of Defense (DoD) 
and Air Force literature was conducted. This review included established and draft 
policy, prior research by Ellison, and other information such as HAZMAT regulations, 
training requirements in the case of paper work errors, and the published guidelines and 
regulations on HAZMAT preparation. Through this review and focus on key connections, 
or lack of connections, to hazardous material supply chain from ordering to delivery on 
AMC aircraft, an understanding of the process will be gained.   Also, data from studies 
currently underway will be reviewed. These studies will show insight into the current 
trends, pending guidance, and problems surrounding frustrated hazmat vendor cargo. 
These studies will show what systems are in place and what, if any, improvements have 
been made by these systems or programs.   
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The most critical and valuable research for this study came from the data 
collected at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB.  These sets of data show all of the specific 
items frustrated from vendor suppliers over a five month period, why they were frustrated 
and what supplier provided the item.   
Other sources of information were qualitative in nature and based on observations 
from visits to the two APOEs of interest.  This qualitative research was important and 
looked at the drastic differences between the two operations.  Primarily this review looks 
closely at the Customer Service Section at Charleston and Dover AFB.   
2.2 Terms and Definitions: 
The following definitions and acronyms are commonly accepted and used as follows: 
(USTRANSCOM, 2004, Eidson, 2005, Ellison, 2005):  
 
120 Days: No Release Event – An audit of cargo listed as frustrated after 120 
days.  The item will be released from the system once it is confirmed that it is no 
longer frustrated. 
 
Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) – the point of arrival in a theater or on arrival 
in the CONUS and generally the last node in the air segment of the DT 
 
Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) – the point of departure for shipments 
entering the airlift component of Defense Transportation System, and generally 
the last transit point for shipments departing the CONUS. 
 
Airlift Clearance Agency (ACA) – Military Service representatives that approve 
and validate the movement of DOD shipments via organic airlift.  
 
APOE Damage – Damage to the cargo occurred while located at the Aerial Port 
of Embarkation 
 
Commercial carrier – a private common user shipping company. For purposes of 
this process architecture, the term commercial carrier applies to organizations 
providing carriage that is not managed by the Defense Transportation System (see 
“lift provider”).  
 
Container Consolidation Point (CCP) – A DLA (Defense Logistics Agency) 
processing location at which government shipments can be originated, 
transshipped, or integrated into larger composite shipment units (air pallets, sea 
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containers, etc). For the GPC pilot, the CCP may be the first point of entry into 
the DDS.  
 
Customer -- The ordering agent or intended recipient of the merchandise.  
 
DDRV – Defense Distribution Depot Richmond Virginia—Provide the full range 
of distribution services and information enabling a seamless, tailored, worldwide 
DoD distribution network that delivers effective, efficient and innovative support 
to combatant commands, military services, and other agencies during peace and 
war. (DDRV, Website) 
 
Defense Transportation System (DTS) -- The organizations, personnel, equipment 
and infrastructure that are owned, operated or managed by the DOD in support of 
the transportation activities within the DOD Supply Chain.  
 
Documents Lost – Documents required for shipment were not present and had to 
be completed before shipment could take place 
 
DOD Distribution Nodes – a functional activity in the DOD organic distribution 
system.  
 
DOD Distribution System (DDS) -- The organizations, personnel, equipment and 
infrastructure that are owned and operated by the DOD in support distribution 
activities within the DOD Supply Chain activities. DDS is synonymous with the 
phrase DOD Organic Distribution System.  
 
Incorrect Certification – HAZMAT paperwork is present but part or all of the 
paperwork is improperly filled out or is in a wrong format.  Examples include 
missing signature or missing/inaccurate HAZMAT identification, HAZDEC does 
not have red boarder or is a copy of a red boarder.  Paperwork is present but 
wrong. 
 
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name – The shipping name was not accurate and had 
to be changed before shipment could take place 
 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference – An inaccurate regulation was sited in the 
shipping document and had to be corrected before shipment could take place 
 
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA) -- group of 
airline members who adopted the rules set forth by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and included additional requirements which are 
more restrictive, reflecting industry standard practices or operational 
considerations.  
 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) -- group 
which sets the standards for international transport of dangerous goods by air.  
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Lift Provider – this a general role term for any organization provide carriage that 
is managed by the Defense Transportation System.  
 
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS (MSDS) -- informational sheets provided 
by the manufacturer to buyers of chemicals produced; information includes 
chemical ingredients, physical data, fire and explosion hazard data, health hazard 
data, spill procedures, product trade name, manufacturer's address, and emergency 
telephone number.  
 
Merchant -- the commercial product seller. This is not necessarily a government 
contracted seller. For purposes of the study, the term merchant and vendor are 
synonymous.  
 
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, ect) – Cargo is frustrated for any 
item not covered by the other categories.  Examples are listed but many other 
items fall into this category 
 
Missing HAZMAT Documents – Some or all of the required HAZMAT shipping 
documents were not present.  Required documents had to be found or redone 
before shipment could take place 
 
Missing Signature – Required signatures for shipment were not present and were 
needed for shipment 
 
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled – This item is frustrated for not having a 
specific type of paperwork that is required for time sensitive items.  Items that 
require dry ice such as blood fall into this category.  This reason has few 
examples but is important to note because often times the item can not be used 
and must be destroyed.  
 
No Documents – Required documents for shipment were not present and needed 
to be found or created for shipment 
 
No Shipping Papers/Declaration  -- Shipping papers, HAZMAT Declarations, or 
shippers declarations are not present or could not be found. 
 
Other – Cargo was frustrated for a reason not covered by the other categories. 
 
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged – Cargo is not packaged properly or the 
packaging has been damaged. 
 
Repeat Exception: Cleared in GATES – The item frustrated was identified twice 
and needed to manually released from the system 
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Routing and Clearance -- The group of processes that approve and authorize the 
use of the DTS. Additional definitions that will add to the understanding of 
shipping requirements, agencies involved, and language used (DLA DDC, 2004):  
 
TCN – Transportation Control Number, when used as a category, something is 
wrong with the TCN such as not present, inaccurate or used for a different piece 
of cargo 
 
TCMD -- Transportation Control Movement Document.  
 
Wrong Frustration Code – Cargo was frustrated for a reason inaccurately and 
needed to be fixed in the system before cargo could be shipped 
 
Wrong Net Explosive Weight – Item is frustrated for HAZDEC having an 
inaccurate Net Explosive Weight.  This is an important and less frequent category 
due to the danger of transporting explosives with errors that describe it.   
 
2.3 HAZMAT Frustrated Cargo Data: 
Looking at previous research by Ellison, we see how this study compares to her 
findings and similar data in her research.  This thesis research project looks very closely 
to determine what can be improved in the HAZMAT shipping process.  This study does 
not look at the government travel card but does look closely at the data that was collected 
as it relates to frustrated cargo at these same locations.  Ellison’s data is analyzed closely 
to see if it agrees with the findings in this research or if other conclusions can be made 
after looking at additional data from the two APOEs. 
Ellison’s research focused on many key points of importance that look at 
solutions to help the cargo delivery process.   The research refers to a very important 
Memorandum that will also be highlighted in this research.  This memo discusses the 
responsibilities the vendors must follow.  The research references that this memo was 
distributed to many vendors to educate them on the current policy in place and how little 
effect this is having. (Ellison 2004)  Additionally, this research by Ellison also suggested 
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that the memo should be revised to include responsibility being shared by both the vendor 
and the transportation officer and that the memo does not go far enough to provide 
requirements or enforce responsibility for repeated frustration occurrences. (Ellison, 
2004)   In fact, the research in Chapter 4 shows that no accountability exists because no 
established communication bridge is formed.  No requirement could be found or exists 
for the Customer Service Section to respond in any particular way.  Vendor’s 
requirements that are viewed through this published document would therefore see this 
information as an advisory and the only accountability would be based on how each 
Customer Service organization runs their operation. 
The Virtual Help Desk mentioned in Ellison’s research, could not be found. 
(Ellison, 2004)  This site was scheduled to come out six months after the close of 
Ellison’s research.  The website was advertised as the “one stop shop” to help vendors 
find the resources required for compliance was not available in my search.  However, a 
similar source of help was found at the “USTRANSCOM Customer Portal” and has 
many resources to include regulations. (USTRAN, 2006)  This is essentially 
USTRANSCOM’s home page.  This site provides news and weather but also has many 
useful links readily available for vendors to use. 
The government purchase card (GPC) was also a major section of the previous 
research. (Ellison, 2004)  This program and the training requirement for members before 
government cards can be issued, is essential to ensure military members are using the tax 
payers money properly.  Additionally, GPC program is essential for members to know 
what vendors should use as a source of supply.  The focus of this research will be on the 
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vendor’s responsibility and not GPC program but that doe not diminish the importance of 
the users responsibility and this program.   
 
2.4  Active Performance Management 
An in-depth review of a pilot program called Active Performance Management 
(APM) was conducted from November 2003 to December 2005. (APM, 2005)  This 
system integrated Data from multiple systems, including the Global Air Terminal 
Execution System (GATES), Distribution Standard System (DSS), Standard Automated 
Material Management System (SAMMS), and Defense Automatic Addressing System 
Center (DAASC). (APM, 2005)  Coincidently, the data that APM compiled was the 
frustrated HAZMAT cargo at both Charleston AFB and Dover AFB.   By having access 
to the data the researcher had a unique opportunity to review this raw data and compile 
the data into a format that could show trends. 
Simply put, this pilot program gave the researcher a large foundation of second 
hand source data to conduct the research for this thesis.   The data was able to be 
reviewed and graphed to provide a baseline for the more specific research that was 
conducted. This information was compared to the data Ellison compiled in 2004.  The 
depot second source data provided by APM could be compared to the vendor second 
hand source data provided by Dover AFB. (Eidson, 2005)  The most useful information 
from this study was that it provided the frustrated HAZMAT data from the depot.  The 
pilot program provided data for this research but is limited in scope as addressed in 
previous sections.  Not only is it limited to the two bases that are being studied in this 
research, but the pilot program just ended and is no longer the system being used to 
monitor these HAZMAT frustration problems.  
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2.5 Regulations on HAZMAT 
HAZMAT is an extremely regulated and controlled item that requires very 
specific detailed instructions and regulations for air delivery.  The Air Force regulation 
that controls this movement and packaging requirements is “AFMAN 24-204 Preparing 
Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments”. (AFMC 2004) This regulation is over 
500 pages long and provides the exact requirement for transportation of every type of 
HAZMAT.  Everything from a D-size battery to a nuclear warhead has a shipment-by-air 
requirement and these requirements are detailed in this regulation.  If there is any 
improper documentation on the HAZMAT paperwork or if the packing requirements 
deviate in any way, the cargo is “frustrated” and can not be delivered by aircraft.    
When vendors receive an order from service members overseas, they have very 
little knowledge of what is required by the Air Force regulations to transport these 
HAZMAT items.  However, vendors are responsible for making sure these items are 
prepared properly for air shipment. (Ellison, 2004)  In a memorandum from the Under 
Secretary of Defense, before a contract can be established with a vendor for the purchase 
of goods or a purchase can be made by a Government Purchase Card (GPC) holder, the 
contract and delivery order must require the vendor to comply with a set of specific 
“business rules”. (UndSecDef, 2003) These nine business rules explain the requirements 
that any commercial vendor must agree to abide by before they will be allowed to do 
business with the government.  The requirements include providing standard 
documentations, shipping address, provide Transportation Control Number (TCN), 
ensure packing slip is posted outside the box and easy to find, make sure items are 
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properly packaged to ensure safe arrival at destination, include hard copies of HAZMAT 
data sheets or packing slips, package HAZMAT properly, provide In Transit visibility 
(ITV) and “provide advanced shipping notice to the first point of the DoD organic 
transportation system.” (UndSecDef, 2003)  
  The Customer Service sections at both Charleston and Dover AFBs are 
responsible for ensuring these vendors adhere to the rules and the vendors are given the 
proper tools and information to have the cargo prepared for continued shipment once the 
item is received by the APOE. (Eidson, 2004)   
In an email forwarded to the researcher by the Dover AFB Customer Service for 
this study, the vendor is requesting an address from the Chief of Customer Service at 
Dover AFB to send cargo too in Dover, Delaware.  This item was purchased under an 
approved contract.  In contracts such as these, the vendor is required to know the process 
and how cargo needs to be sent.  When Customer Service at Dover asked very simple 
questions such as the Transportation Control Number (TCN) to help identify the cargo, 
the vendor did not know what that was.   
Many tools exist so that vendors can determine shipment requirements before it is 
sent to the APOE. (DLA 2004).  The tools are readily available and the vendors should be 
properly trained on how to send HAZMAT cargo properly.  One site that seems the most 
inclusive is the Defense Logistics Agency’s home page that has links to most tools 
necessary for defense transportation requirements.(DLA 2004) 
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Figure 1. Defense Logistic Agency Home Page (DLA, 2005) 
 
Here vendors can use the tools necessary to determine what is required for 
shipment to the user.  Additional tools such as the Global Transportation Network, Fed 
Ex, TCN tracking tools and sites used to determine packaging requirements are listed.   
Many references exist and are readily available for order on disk or online for 
commercial vendors to use and ensure that they are in compliance.  Defense 
Transportation Regulation 4500.9 provides requirements for all forms of shipping.  This 
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regulation includes chapter 204 that has the specific requirements for HAZMAT. (DTR, 
2006)  Online resources offer websites for vendors to make these purchases online and 
buy the required Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR’s) or Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Regulations. (HMR, 2006)   Both of these items can be purchased for between $30 
and $50 and provide many of the requirements needed for HAZMAT shipments.    
 
2.6  Summary 
This chapter looked at previous literature and tools available for HAZMAT 
transportation.  The tools and resources are available to support the vendor, user and 
APOE and are critical sources of support to move critical HAZMAT material.  This 
literature review not only shows what has been studied in the past but looks at a number 
of tools available for every part of the supply chain.  These tools are easily accessible to 
help manage and move the cargo properly.  In this review, it becomes apparent that the 
key to moving HAZMAT materials is the education of DoD vendors and for them to be 
given the proper training and requirements so that the cargo arrives at the APOE prepared 
to be loaded and delivered by air transportation.  
 The next chapter looks at the methodology of how this research is conducted.  
The chapter will revisit the investigative questions and go over the specific process that is 
used to conduct the research.      
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III. Methodology 
  
3.1 Introduction 
 The research focuses on frustrated HAZMAT from Dover and Charleston AFB in 
an effort to determine and analyze problem areas with the quantitative data collected.  
HAZMAT delivery is a top priority by our leadership due to the critical nature of this 
cargo.  With very little research being done in the past, this research continues to build on 
Ellison’s research and opens large opportunities for future study.  The lack of research is 
primarily due to the difficulty in quantifying the problem areas.  These investigative 
questions are looked at separately to find out what impact each area has on the overall 
HAZMAT cargo delivery mission.  A personal look at the two separate Customer Service 
section shows the vast difference in operational protocols.  Analyzing causes and the 
average length of frustrated cargo that are sourced from the depot shows main areas that 
can be improved on from this source.   Next, the research looks at overall trends seen for 
HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB.  Finally, a close look at 
the HAZMAT coming from vendor sources shows the main causes of frustration and 
what vendors are most often responsible.         
 
3.2 Problem Statement 
What current reasons are frustrating cargo at Dover and Charleston AFBs and 
what improvements can be made to commercial supplier’s and carrier’s HAZMAT 
packaging and delivery process that will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper to 
departing inter-theater aircraft?   
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3.3 Methodology 
The basis for this research is to look at a problem that faces two very similar 
bases.  Charleston and Dover Air Force base have a very similar mission using two 
different types of aircraft.  From afar without looking closely at the operation, the only 
difference that could be seen would be the C-17 that flies for Charleston AFB and the C-5 
that flies for Dover AFB.  This research started with site visits and interviews at these 
two bases and visits with each Customer Service section.  During these visits more 
differences became apparent.  Since the basis for this thesis is a close look at the 
transportation operations and how HAZMAT is handled, a close personal look at each of 
these bases is required.  It was important to interview the Customer Service Chief for 
each operation and get a first hand perspective on how things are managed.  This aspect 
of the research focused on how they were performing the mission and how the entire 
shop perceived the operation to be handling frustrated HAZMAT shipments.  To be able 
to compare these two locations accurately, the qualifications and attitudes of the 
personnel and their work environment was looked at.  Interest in this area of the study 
became noteworthy when observations identified the large contrast between the two 
locations. 
The research next takes a quantitative approach looking at historical data of 
frustrated HAZMAT cargo at Dover and Charleston Air Force Base.  By breaking down 
the reasons for frustration, the most common reasons for frustration are analyzed.  These 
results are then compared to Ellison’s previous results to see how the most recent year 
compares to the similar data that was collected during 2003-2004 research.  In 
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preliminary collection it was realized that no research was conducted that looked at the 
differences between vendor supplied HAZMAT and depot supplied HAZMAT.  
Therefore, these two categories were analyzed separately.  This allowed for an accurate 
picture to be illustrated that showed the different problems causing HAZMAT frustration.    
Vendor frustrated cargo and depot frustrated cargo was looked at differently 
based on the data that was present or provided for each base.  Personnel at Dover AFB 
were more able to provide records or were more willing to provide the data that was 
requested.  From Dover AFB, four months of data was collected that showed over 400 
data points of frustrated HAZMAT.  Trend analysis is used to see if anything can be 
improved in the transportation preparation to make this HAZMAT more airworthy.  
These data points also showed what the cargo was, what company provided the item, and 
what shipper was used for delivery.  By conducting a regression model with this data, the 
research identifies what items of cargo are being frustrated most often.  The research also 
determines what vendors are having the most problems and providing frustrated cargo the 
most often. 
Focus is given to the entire supply chain and the research looks at how the 
HAZMAT cargo was delivered.  The research also looks at how this HAZMAT was 
prepared and what could be improved in the ordering, production and shipping process to 
improve cargo preparation to make HAZMAT cargo more airworthy when it arrives at 
APOE.   
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3.4 Research Approach 
The initial approach was to analyze the data gathered from two APOEs.  
However, once both Customer Services were visited, basic differences in how these 
sections were managed became apparent.  Observing how employees conduct their 
customer service operations showed two very different approaches and styles to manage 
the process.  Informal questions were asked as to how long members have worked there 
and how different situations are handled.  In both cases, the answers were very different 
between Charleston and Dover AFB.  Although not originally intended for this research, 
a qualitative investigative question was developed to analyze these differences. What are 
the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at Dover and Charleston 
AFB and how do these differences affect the transport of HAZMAT?  This question asked 
and explained the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at Dover 
AFB and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the mission? 
The next two investigative questions looks at frustrated cargo that comes from the 
depot and breaks down what the most common causes are for the frustration.  This 
research provides a quantitative analysis comparing the length of delay to the causes of 
the frustration.   The data from Active Performance Management System compiled 
through GATES shows the reasons and number of occurrences that depot HAZMAT is 
frustrated.  This data is broken down by base showing a break down of the most repeated 
problems.  The next research question takes this same data and looks at the average time 
delay for this HAZMAT frustrated cargo.  Outliers are identified and analyzed and the 
overall delays are discussed.    The following are the second and third investigative 
question:  What are common causes for depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston 
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and Dover AFB and what is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated 
cargo? 
Investigative question four asks, What trend is observed from the frustrated 
HAZMAT performance metric at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB?  This part of the 
research shows what patterns exist and studies if the HAZMAT cargo frustration is 
improving or if indications from data show the problem is getting worse.  A tool called 
Activity Performance Management compiles data from the GATES and GTN information 
systems and displays this information in a graph for a weekly update.  As mentioned 
before, this system was a pilot program for Charleston and Dover AFB but served as an 
excellent tool to use for the research this thesis is focusing on.   The table presented in 
chapter four is from the last report Active Performance Management produced and it 
studies the necessity for this research by showing trends for frustrated HAZMAT.  
Finally, questions were sent to the Chief of Customer Service at Dover AFB to help 
analyze what is causing these trends.  The questions, answers and analysis are expanded 
on in chapter four.   
 Investigative question five analyses the specific HAZMAT frustrated cargo at 
Dover AFB to determine what vendors are supplying the most frequently frustrated 
cargo.  A more in depth analysis is conducted to study vendors that frequently source 
frustrated HAZMAT cargo.  The cargo from the most frequent suppliers of frustrated 
HAZMAT is looked at to determine what the most frequent cause of frustration so that 
potential problems with the vendor can be identified.  At Dover AFB this data is 
compiled by Eidson into an Excel document on a monthly basis.  Similar data including 
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the same information was not recorded by Charleston AFB and is therefore not available.    
The following is asked in Investigative question five: 
 What trends can be identified when cross referencing reasons for frustrated 
HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?  
A. What reasons primarily cause HAZMAT to be frustrated? 
B. What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT? 
A few adjustments had to be made to the data so that it could be sorted into a 
manageable product and the “Reasons” descriptions could be better categorized: 
About 50 reasons were noted from the raw data to explain why something was frustrated.  
These reasons are organized into different seven categories so that a clear picture of the 
problem could be understood.  These reasons were broken down into the following 
manageable explanations: 
1.  No Shipping Papers/Declarations 
2.  Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 
3.  Incorrect Certification 
4.  TCN 
5.  No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 
6.  Wrong Net Explosive Weight 
7.  Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 
 
As many as ten different Reasons were identified that indicated something was 
wrong with the Transportation Control Number (TCN).  These reasons ranged from too 
many digits in the TCN, too few digits in the TCN, No TCN, incorrect TCN, and 
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duplicate TCN.  To manage this reason in a more concise manor, anything wrong with 
the TCN was changed just to “TCN” as the reason. 
Many items were identified as missing paper work.  Many examples existed to 
include No HAZMAT Declarations (HAZDEC), improper labeling, no air HAZDEC or 
missing required paperwork.  Anything that was missing paperwork of any kind that was 
required for shipment to be processed was labeled as “No Shipping Papers/Declaration” 
An even larger number of reasons were identified that indicated the HAZMAT 
cargo had the right paper work present but something on the paper work was not done 
properly.  Examples noted were incorrect packing paragraph, HAZDEC did not have 
proper red boarder, incorrect quantity noted, no signature on HAZDEC, wrong packaging 
paragraph, No shipper information or phone number, no hazardous markings and 
incorrect ULN Number.  All of these examples were labeled “Incorrect Certification”  
Packaging incorrect or damaged was used as an explanation when something was 
wrong with the packaging itself.  Some reasons put into this category included packaging 
was damaged, package was not sealed or properly used, packaging did not meet 
requirements for transportation, in one case the vehicle was damaged and was not sent so 
that it could be repaired. 
The category “Wrong Net Explosive Weight” did not have many occurrences but 
justified its own category because of the serious safety concern.  These items were 
frustrated because the total weight of explosive material was inaccurate on the paperwork 
and had to be fixed before shipment. 
When a number of other reasons for frustration occurred, they were categorized as 
Miscellaneous.  Reasons for this category could be split shipments.  A split shipment is 
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when the cargo present at the APOE is frustrated and waiting on the rest of the cargo to 
arrive to the APOE.  Another situation involved the vehicles keys being locked in the car.  
Any reason that was not covered by the other six categories was listed as Miscellaneous. 
These reasons were tabulated on a spreadsheet with the name of the vendors 
frequency of occurrences added up.  A list of these companies with two or more 
occurrences is highlighted.  Seven companies with the most occurrences were separated 
into another chart and a break down of why these items were frustrated was tallied. A Chi 
Square statistical analysis is conducted to determine if these items are dependent or 
independent.   These results and analysis are also found in chapter four.   
 Finally, the research found number of other findings and are presented in the 
Additional Findings section.  The 400 data points used in investigative five is grouped 
into 45 day blocks of data and compared to the research conducted by Ellison.  Ellison’s 
data consisted of one and half months of data from 2004.  this previous data is compared 
to two different subsets of equal time from the most current four months of data 
collected.  The research and analysis of this study can be found in chapter four. 
 
3.4.1 Reverse Approach 
The approach of this research study is to review the supply chain process of 
HAZMAT in reverse order to identify problems that could speed up the process and get 
this critical cargo to the war fighter.  The analysis looks at the frustrated HAZMAT by 
looking at the cargo itself and works backwards analyzing the communication that leads 
to a frustrated product arriving at the APOE.   A close look to see what trends exist and 
what improvements can be made to get this cargo where it is needed.  Ellison discovered 
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that the communication of required cargo is flowing from the troops out in the field 
directly to the vendor or depot.  This is telling the supplier what is needed but not how it 
needs to be prepared for transportation to meet the airlift requirement.  The users in the 
field do not necessarily know the requirements for the cargo to be shipped and are only 
able to purchase what is needed.  After the cargo is ordered and delivered from the 
vendor or depot, the user only knows that the cargo is in the transportation system and 
often times assume the cargo is lost (Ellison, 2004).  Often times the result is a duplicate 
order being made due to the critical need for the cargo.  Because the vendor is not 
sending the item through the transportation system properly, the delay at the APOE 
happens frequently leaving the lack of communication with the APOE a significant 
problem.  The figure XXX  illustrates the current system: 
 
Dover AFB
Forward Location
Charleston AFB
Depot Commercial VendorDepot
Commercial 
Vendor
Order Flow
Cargo Flow
Air Mobility Supply Chain
 
Figure 2. Air Mobility Supply Chain   
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 Studying the communication sources, order and cargo flow, leads to identification 
of trends and further recommendations in chapter four. 
 
3.5 Data Sources 
Dover and Charleston Air Force base handle most of the eastbound cargo destined 
for Europe and the Middle East.  Since the research of interest is to look at how that 
process is run for HAZMAT material, a close look at Dover and Charleston AFB was the 
primary data source for this study.  During a site visit, the existing process was studied 
and key officials interviewed to determine how the process was run.  All of the data used 
for the quantitative research was gathered from the respective Customer Service Sections 
at Dover and Charleston and AFBs.  The data was also limited to available information 
that they had or were willing to provide.    
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter describes the methodology used to analyze the frustrated HAZMAT 
at Dover and Charleston AFB.  This chapter also shows how data for vendor and depot 
supplied cargo will be organized and presented in chapter four.   The research 
investigative questions were looked at to show how each one will be quantified and what 
approach will be used to answer them.  The next chapters will analyze the results of this 
data, provide results, conclusions and a spring board for other research to be continued.
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the results the data, provided 
by Dover and Charleston Air Force Base.  The metrics of interest look at the frustrated 
HAZMAT cargo at both locations and show various trends and analysis.  The overall 
research question of the study is restated and the results and analysis of each investigative 
question is presented.  Additionally, a conclusion and additional findings are also 
presented.   Two types of data were analyzed: frustration cargo from depot shipments and 
from commercial vendors.  In total, 615 occurrences from both sources are used for this 
research from the period August to November 2005.  The following is a detailed analysis 
of these occurrences. 
 
4.2 Restatement of Research Question 
What are the current reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston 
AFBs and what improvements can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that 
will allow cargo to move faster and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft? 
 
4.3 Investigative Question One 
What are the major differences between the Customer Service Operations at 
Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences affect the transport of 
HAZMAT? 
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Significant differences are noted in the operational approach between Dover and 
Charleston AFB.  These differences include a very different command structure, different 
approaches to how frustrated cargo is handled, as well as a difference in the overall 
perspective of how the mission should be handled.    
The supervisor is in charge of the Customer Service Section for Dover AFB has 
been in this position for over 15 years and has provided a great deal of support to this 
research project. (Eidson, 2005)  A very experienced extra effort was observed in how the 
supervisor runs the Customer Service Section during the four day observation period.   
Among other things, the section reviews and handles all frustrated HAZMAT that comes 
through the Dover AFB APOE.  During an informal interview with the supervisor, the 
researcher learned in detail what the job consists of on a daily basis and how the 
supervisor personally handles all cargo discrepancies that come through Dover AFB.  
Specifically, in most cases as a general rule, when Dover AFB has frustrated HAZMAT 
cargo, and the discrepancy is determined to be the fault of the vendor, the item is sent 
back to the vendor so it could be fixed.   
  Observations and discussions from 5 through 8 September, is when the 
researcher first learned, from the supervisors perspective, that the handling of the entire 
operation at Dover AFB is very different than Charleston AFB.  The next week, the 
researcher drove down to Charleston AFB to observe their Customer Service Operations 
and to determine what differences existed.     
During a similar three day observation visit, Charleston AFB appeared to handle 
the Customer Service Operations very differently.  The reasons for these differences are 
very apparent by observing the personnel running the Customer Service Shop.  The 
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Customer Service section chief position is currently vacant and has been for almost a 
year.  A newly promoted NCO has been appointed NCO In Charge (NCOIC) of customer 
service and has been “in charge” for about a month.  Unlike the senior leader of customer 
service at Dover AFB, the Charleston AFB NCOIC is working in this section for the first 
time in his career and readily admits he is not as familiar with the operation as required.   
As the senior member in charge he explained that his primary duty was learning the 
operation.  Many of the researcher’s questions about the operation and procedure policies 
were best answered by the civilian staff assigned to the section.  Two other individuals 
are assigned to Customer Service Section, both government employed civilians, who 
have worked in this operation for a combined 25 years.     
The following figure illustrates the current chain of command structure for 
Customer Service at Charleston AFB:     
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Figure 3. Charleston AFB Customer Service Organization Chart 
 
This figure shows the major differences in experience between the leadership and 
the customer service representatives.   It shows the vast differences in leadership that are 
in charge at Charleston AFB Customer Service Section and no experience requirement is 
in place for this very critical section.   
 Additional differences observed were in basic procedures and how HAZMAT 
cargo frustrations are handled.  The basic procedure differences between Charleston and 
Dover AFB are very clear.  In most situations and as a matter of policy, when an item 
delivered to Dover from a vendor is frustrated for discrepancies caused by the vendor, the 
item is sent back for the vendor to fix.  Eidson explained that vendors will continue to 
have problems providing cargo in the proper air-worthy configuration unless they realize 
what they did wrong.   In drastic contrast, when HAZMAT cargo is frustrated at 
NCOIC 
Experience: 1 Month 
GS Civilian 
Experience: 15 Years 
GS Civilian 
Experience: 10 Years 
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Charleston AFB, the discrepancies are fixed when ever possible and shipped right away.  
The rational is that the war fighter needs these HAZMAT items quickly and the quickest 
way to fix the frustrated item is to fix the discrepancy so the cargo can be transported 
sooner. 
The most interesting detail about these findings is that both bases are aware of 
how the other base handles the customer service operation.  Both customer service offices 
equally stood behind how they manage their operation and strongly criticized how the 
other base handles theirs.  Both methods have advantages and disadvantages that are very 
clear and have rippling ramifications through out the entire supply chain.   The 
advantages of sending cargo back to the vendor force them to fix the problem that they 
created and learn from the mistake of sending cargo improperly.  The disadvantage is that 
the critical cargo destined for the war fighter is delayed and the increased shipping cost is 
incurred by sending the cargo back to the vendor.  A copy of the memorandum published 
by the Under Secretary of the Air Force explaining vendor requirements is often 
accompanied (Ellison 2004). The advantages to fixing the problem on site are that the 
cargo is delivered to the war-fighter quicker but the vendor is never corrected for sending 
the cargo improperly.  The quantitative data on cargo delay times in the sections below 
supports these unit level policies and the investigative questions below analyze these two 
very different approaches. 
  
4.3.1 Investigative Question One: Analysis 
From the research conducted at both locations, it seems apparent that the 
Customer Service Section is the most important section for HAZMAT Transportation 
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Management in the Aerial Port.  They represent the Air Force as the link between civilian 
vendors and deployed forces overseas for HAZMAT shipments.  Furthermore, Customer 
Service controls the data of all cargo coming through and is charged with the 
responsibility to educate commercial vendors on DoD HAZMAT shipping procedures.  
At the very least, the Customer Service Section is responsible for providing tools to 
vendors so they can educate themselves.  This requirement is the shipper’s responsibility 
to deliver the cargo in the proper method and it is required that the shipper pay for the 
expense (AFMAN 24-204, 2001).  
For a section as important as the Customer Service Section, providing highly 
trained and experienced individuals should be a top priority.  Much of the data collected 
for research was provided by Dover’s Customer Service.  However, collecting data and 
required metrics is not universally accepted and varies between locations.  A uniformed 
standard between Aerial Ports for information gathering on frustrated HAZMAT 
shipments and customer service requirements for handling frustrations seems to be the 
most lacking element to making aerial port customer service operations a standardized 
success. 
 
4.4 Investigative Question Two 
What are common causes for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo at Charleston and 
Dover AFB? 
Below is data compiled from Active Performance Management System (APMS) 
through the Gates information system, that shows in descending order, the “Reasons” and 
“number of occurrences” that depot HAZMAT is frustrated.  This cargo comes from all 
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of the depots in the United States or over two dozen locations. (Eidson, 2006)  This data 
is separated by base and shows a breakdown of the most repeated problems at each 
location.  The 92 total occurrences between the two bases is from a four month period 
between 1 August to 31 November 2005.  Some of the data included in this timeframe is 
from frustration occurrences which began as early as March 2005 but are in the system 
during the four months represented.  
  A definition of the “Reason” can be found in the Literature Review to help 
identify what the problem consists of.  Currently, the most common reason cargo is 
frustrated at Charleston AFB is for an Incorrect Regulatory Reference.  This indicates 
that part of the HAZMAT paperwork is not accurate and the paperwork needed to be 
corrected before the cargo could be released from frustration.   
      
Table 1. Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Charleston AFB 
Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences by Type: Charleston Air Force Base 
Reason Number  Percent 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 10 27.78%
Not Regulated 9 25.00%
No Documents 8 22.22%
120 Days: No Release Event 3 8.33%
APOE Damage 3 8.33%
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name 1 2.78%
Missing Signature 1 2.78%
Other 1 2.78%
Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates 0 0.00%
Wrong Frustration Code 0 0.00%
Total 36 100.00%
 
Table 2 shows the same information for Dover AFB during the same time frame 
of four months.   The most common reason cargo was frustrated at Dover AFB was for 
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No Documents.  This indicates that either the HAZMAT, shipping or some other 
paperwork is not present and needed to be found or completed be the cargo could be 
released from frustration.    
  
Table 2.  Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Dover AFB   
           Number of Depot Frustrated Cargo Occurrences by Type: Dover Air Force Base 
Reason Number  Percent 
No Documents 10 17.86%
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 9 16.07%
Other 8 14.29%
Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates 7 12.50%
Not Regulated 6 10.71%
Missing Signature 5 8.93%
120 Days: No Release Event 5 8.93%
Wrong Frustration Code 3 5.36%
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name 2 3.57%
APOE Damage 1 1.79%
Total 56.00 100.00%
 
 
4.4.1 Investigative Question Two: Analysis 
Both bases appear to have similar reasons and frequency for occurrences.  Dover 
AFB had more occurrences but this could be explained by the larger quantities of Depot 
cargo coming through this APOE.  15 of the 92 exceptions are from human error due to a 
previously frustrated item not being released from the system or for a single frustrated 
occurrence being entered twice.  These items are part of the “Reason” category “120 
Days: No Release Event” and “Repeat Exception: Cleared in Gates” respectively.  It is 
important to note that 12 of these 15 occurrences are from Dover AFB.  Nine occurrences 
are in the category “other” and apply to any frustration that does not fit into this category.  
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Examples range from keys locked in the vehicle to the shipment being incomplete and 
waiting for additional cargo. 
 
4.5 Investigative Question Three 
What is the average time delay for Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo? 
The tables below show the most common causes and average number of days for 
depot frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB in the months of August and 
September 2005.   These cause for frustrated cargo were chosen because they represent 
the most significant causes for delay and are therefore the most significant to focus on.   
The first Table below is for Charleston AFB and has examples of delay for five of the 
eight categories. 
 
Table 3. Average Delay Depot Cargo is Frustrated: 
Charleston AFB (2 Months) 
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Charleston AFB-Aug-Sep 2005 
Reason Average Delay 
Other 44.1 
No Documents 3.0 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 2.4 
Not Regulated 2.0 
APOE Damage 0 
Missing Signature 0 
Repeat Exception 0 
 
The most significant cause for delay listed as other is “120 Days: No Release 
Event” of 44 days.  It is important to note that this is not frustrated HAZMAT cargo.  
This is a previously frustrated item that was not cleared from the system when the 
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original frustration problem was fixed.  The frustrated item was fixed but Gates never 
tracked the cargo leaving and does not have accountability of the cargo.  If the item is not 
found anywhere at the APOE and is still in the system as not sent, it falls into this 
category.  It is assumed the item was either shipped overseas or back to the vendor.  The 
next table shows the same data for Dover AFB during the identical time frame.  Dover 
AFB had examples of eight different reasons for frustrated HAZMAT cargo and the 
average time delay is represented.   
  
Table 4. Average Depot Delay Cargo is Frustrated:   
Dover AFB (Two Months)   
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Dover AFB-Aug-Sep 2005 
Reason Average Delay 
Other 13.3 
No Documents 5.7 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 5.8 
Repeat Exception 5.4 
Missing Signature 3.6 
Not Regulated 1.8 
APOE Damage 1.7 
 
 
Analyzing the data shown in Tables 3 and 4, causes for depot frustrated cargo is 
significant at Charleston AFB and not as significant at Dover AFB.   The data consists of 
frustrated cargo from August 2005 to September 2005.  Examples of the “120 Day” no 
release have occurred at Charleston AFB and is an example of Gates not being updated 
properly and the cargo’s location unknown.  Comparing the two tables seems to confirm 
how the finding in Investigative Question One, due to the longer delay’s at Dover AFB.  
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When this data is expanded from a two month period to a four month period, a different 
look is represented.  When the data is expanded, it appears to smooth out the results and 
causes of frustration.   Table 5 below shows the most common causes and average 
number of days for depot frustrated cargo at Charleston for the four month period from 
August 2005 to November 2005: 
 
Table 5. Average Delay Depot Cargo is Frustrated:   
Charleston AFB (Four Months)   
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Charleston AFB- Aug to Nov 2005 
Reason Average Delay 
APOE Damage 58.0 
Not Regulated 7.7 
Missing Signature 6.3 
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name 4.9 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 4.1 
No Documents 3.0 
Other 0.2 
Wrong Frustration Code 0 
 
In this data set, Charleston AFB has a number of different reasons that were not 
represented in the previous table.  Six categories represent Average Delay’s of four days 
or more.   The reason “APOE Damage” is skewed by one item that was damaged on site.  
This cargo was a vehicle that could not be moved till damage caused by a minor accident 
was fixed. Table six below shows data for the same four month period at Dover AFB.  
Like Charleston AFB, the table shows the most common causes and average number of 
days for depot frustrated cargo for a four month period from August 2005 to November 
2005: 
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Table 6. Average Delay Cargo is Frustrated:  Dover AFB (Four Months)   
Average Days to Resolve Frustrated Cargo: Dover AFB – Aug to Nov 2005 
Reason Average Delay 
Wrong Frustration Code 13.05 
No Documents 5.77 
Other 5.35 
Not Regulated 4.51 
Incorrect Proper Shipping Name 3.63 
Missing Signature 3.59 
Incorrect Regulatory Reference 3.49 
APOE Damage 1.73 
Missing HazMat Documents 0.00 
 
 Similar to Charleston AFB, the data is much more smoothed and has examples of 
frustration from most reason categories.  The longest delay was caused by entering the 
wrong frustration code that was frustrated for some other reason.  When an error is 
created by documenting the error wrong, time is wasted to fix a problem that does not 
exist and than the actually frustration cause needs to be fixed.  The next section below 
analyzes the most significant findings and analysis of this data. 
 
4.5.1 Investigative Question Three: Analysis 
Although not confirmed with the Customer Service sections at Dover and 
Charleston AFB, the data for Research Question Three supports the findings from 
Research Question One.  For eight of the nine reasons cargo is frustrated at Dover and 
Charleston AFB, the delay is longer at Charleston AFB.  Six of these nine categories and 
most of the reasons represented in this data, are caused by the depot not providing the 
cargo with proper paper work or the paper work not being properly completed.  The next 
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research question looks at the trends over time to see if HAZMAT cargo frustration rates 
are improving or if the problem is getting worse.     
 
4.6 Investigative Question Four 
What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT performance metrics at 
Charleston AFB and Dover AFB? 
Below is a table that shows a Frustration Summary report provided by Gates and 
APM that illustrates the number of New and Resolved Frustrations for each week.   The 
data on the left axis shows the number of HAZMAT frustrated shipments.  On the right 
axis is the percentage of HAZMAT that is frustrated.  This data is displayed by week and 
is separated into three categories for “New” Frustrations shown in red, “Resolved” 
frustrations shown in yellow and “Open” frustrations shown in Blue.  This metrics is a 
combined set of data for Charleston and Dover AFB and was used during the weekly 
tele-conference APM meetings between the two bases as well as the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA).  Below is the final table for the last APM meeting that concluded the 
APM test evaluation in December, 2005.  
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Table 7. Frustrated HazMat Shipments:  Dover and Charleston (APM, 2005)
Data Source: GATES to APM Data Feed. Frustration Detail Extract 25 November 2005 (midnight)
 
4.6.1 Investigative Question Four: Analysis 
The Frustration Summary Metrics Report initially shows very consistent 
performance; with a low number and percentage of frustrations occurring each week.   
These frustrations appear to be matched by resolutions that keep the number of open 
frustrations minimized.  However, the last few weeks show a significant pattern of Open 
items of frustrated HAZMAT.  Specifically, a large number of frustrations the week of 24 
October have generated a spike in the backlog of open exceptions at Dover and 
Charleston AFB.  The table shows the percentage of frustrated cargo has spiked for 
Dover and Charleston AFB, doubling and even tripling open items in a one month time 
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frame.   It is important to re-emphasize that this data is coming from APM which was in a 
test period at the time and ended 1 December 2005.  The validity of this data may be 
questionable but illustrates that the Air Force is trying to find a product that can show a 
clear picture of frustrated HAZMAT problems.  However, the data could illustrate a 
significant problem and a back log of frustrated HAZMAT.  When the chief of customer 
service at Dover AFB, was asked why the surge existed, the response was:  
We usually get a surge of cargo in the middle of Oct thru Nov.  Then it 
tapes off somewhat over the holidays.  It slows down middle of August 
thru September due to the fiscal year.  The transportation account codes 
(TAC) have to be revalidated each year for funding.  Many holders of 
TACs don’t revalidate in a timely manner and they don’t have any money 
to ship.  So, therefore, they start shipping in October all their backed up 
requisitions.  This causes the surge.  (Eidson 2006) 
 
4.7 Investigative Question Five 
What trends can be identified when cross referencing reasons for frustrated 
HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the cargo?  
A. What reasons primarily cause vendor supplied HAZMAT to be frustrated? 
B. What commercial vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT? 
 Table eight shows the frequency and reason vendor sourced HAZMAT at Dover 
AFB was frustrated from 1 August to 31 November 2005.  The 423 data points of 
frustrated HAZMAT are separated and categorized into one of these eight areas of major 
concern.  This data is used to illustrate why the cargo was frustrated and what were the 
most common problems.   
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Table 8. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments: Dover AFB (Eidson 2006) 
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005 
Reason  # Shipments % of Total 
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 67 15.84%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 45 10.64%
Incorrect Certification 105 24.82%
TCN 191 45.15%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 2 0.47%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight 7 1.65%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 6 1.42%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments 423 100.00%
 
 The most significant problem noted in the table above is that something is wrong 
with the Transportation Control Number (TCN).  The cargo is arriving to the APOE from 
the vendor with the TCN either missing or inaccurate.  This TCN number is used in Gates 
so that the cargo can be tracked properly and to ensure the cargo is not lost in the 
transportation system.  Most of these items of frustrated cargo can be attributed to the 
vendor making some error that caused the frustration and the delay.  The following table 
takes the same 423 items of vendor sourced frustrated HAZMAT and begins to look at 
the vendors that provided this cargo. 
Table 9. Frustrated Vendor Sourced HAZMAT  
# of Frustrated Occurences 423 
# of Vendors 225 
Average Frustrationed Cargo Per Vendor 1.88 
Standard Deviation of Frustrated Cargo Per Vendor 3.59 
Maximum Occurences 37 
Minimum Occurences 1 
 
 A very large number of vendors have examples of frustrated cargo during this 
four month time frame.  225 vendors provided the 423 instances of frustrated HAZMAT.  
Furthermore, each vendor had an average of 1.88 occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT 
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during this time.  50 of the 225 vendors had two or more occurrences and are shown in 
Table 10.  This data analyzes the specific vendor and shows how many occurrences of 
frustrated HAZMAT each company had during this four month period.  175 companies 
are not mentioned and had only one occurrence of frustrated HAZMAT during this time 
period. 
 
Table 10. Frustrated HAZMAT Occurrences at Dover AFB for each Vendor  
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005 
Vendor Occurences % of Frustrated Cargo
TOTAL 423 100.00% 
GSA 37 8.75%
UNKNOWN 29 6.86%
THE INSITU GROUP 23 5.44%
HONEYWELL 11 2.60%
CUMMINS 10 2.36%
LOCKHEED MARTIN 10 2.36%
UNIVERSAL PROPULSION 8 1.89%
GTSI CORP 6 1.42%
KBR SERVICES INC 6 1.42%
ALLOY SURFACES CO 5 1.18%
GRAINGER 5 1.18%
ATK THIOKOL INC 4 0.95%
GATEWAY 4 0.95%
MCDOWELL RESEARCH 4 0.95%
OFFICE DEPOT 4 0.95%
RSPC 4 0.95%
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES 3 0.71%
CDW-G 3 0.71%
DCMA 3 0.71%
DELL COMPUTER 3 0.71%
KIDDE 3 0.71%
LAB SAFETY SUPPLY 3 0.71%
NORTHROP GRUMMAN 3 0.71%
RAYTHEON MISSILE SYS 3 0.71%
SANDSTRON PRODUCTS 3 0.71%
SQUARE ONE ARMORING 3 0.71%
ABBOTT LAB 2 0.47%
ADVANCE SCIENTIFIC 2 0.47%
BENCO DENTAL SUPPLY 2 0.47%
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DAY & ZIMMERMAN 2 0.47%
DTST 2 0.47%
EAST TEXAS LIGHTHOUSE 2 0.47%
GOVT SCIENTIFIC 2 0.47%
GOVT SCIENTIFIC SOURCES 2 0.47%
HARRIS CORP 2 0.47%
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLIES 2 0.47%
J&L INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY 2 0.47%
JC WHITNEY 2 0.47%
JUNIPER ELBOW CO 2 0.47%
MSC INDUSTIRAL SUPPLY 2 0.47%
NEW BEGINNINGS 2 0.47%
NOBLE SALES STORE 2 0.47%
OFFICE ZONE 2 0.47%
OLVA 2 0.47%
PHOENIX REMANUFACTURED 2 0.47%
ROBERTS RESEARCH LAB 2 0.47%
SKYLAND 2 0.47%
THERMO ELECTRON CORP 2 0.47%
ULINE INC 2 0.47%
WERNER 2 0.47%
Other Companies With One Occurrence 175 41.37%
Table 10. (Continued) 
  
The data show that close to 59% of the frustrated HAZMAT comes from 22% of 
the vendors.  Additionally, 40% of the frustrated HAZMAT comes from 7% or 16 of the 
225 vendors.  The table eleven looks at the top six vendors that have provided 21.5% of 
the frustrated cargo at Dover AFB.  Frustrated cargo coming from an Unknown source 
was grouped together and is also presented.   
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Table 11. Vendors Providing Frustrated HAZMAT Most Frequently  
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005 
Vendor Frequency % of Frustrated Cargo Reason Frequency
TOTAL 128    
GSA 37 8.75% 37
No Shipping Papers/Declarations   8
Miscellaneous   9
Incorrect Certification   16
TCN   2
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged     2
UNKNOWN 29 6.86% 29
No Shipping Papers/Declarations   10
Miscellaneous   3
Incorrect Certification   4
TCN   11
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged     1
THE INSITU GROUP 23 5.44% 23
No Shipping Papers/Declarations    
Miscellaneous    
Incorrect Certification   23
TCN    
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged       
HONEYWELL 11 2.60% 11
No Shipping Papers/Declarations   1
Miscellaneous    
Incorrect Certification    
TCN   10
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged       
LOCKHEED MARTIN 10 2.36% 10
No Shipping Papers/Declarations   4
Miscellaneous    
Incorrect Certification   2
TCN   2
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled   1
Wrong Net Explosive Weight   1
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged       
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CUMMINS 10 2.36% 10
No Shipping Papers/Declarations    
Miscellaneous   1
Incorrect Certification    
TCN   9
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged       
UNIVERSAL PROPULSION 8 1.89% 8
No Shipping Papers/Declarations   8
Miscellaneous    
Incorrect Certification    
TCN    
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled    
Wrong Net Explosive Weight    
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged       
Table 11. (Continued) 
 
4.7.1 Investigative Question Five: Analysis 
The last table illustrates the greatest significance when analyzing research 
question five.  The data clearly appears to be independent with each vendor represented 
appearing to have very different problems leading to the HAZMAT cargo being 
frustrated.  Bad TCN’s seem to be the most reoccurring reason.  This was also shown in 
the first table.  However, “No Shipping/Declarations” and “Incorrect Certification” are 
also seen in large frequency for specific vendors.  These vendors each appear to have 
points of emphasis that could be reviewed to improve the particular problem.   
An interesting finding is that the largest source of frustrated HAZMAT comes 
from the Government Service Administration (GSA) and represents 8.75% of all 
frustrated HAZMAT.  It could be easily be argued that the largest source of frustrated 
HAZMAT comes from a vendor that should be most familiar with the HAZMAT cargo 
delivery requirements.  To fully understand the significance, further analysis is required 
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to determine the overall percentage of HAZMAT that comes from GSA.  This is one 
organization that should be familiar with government regulations set by The Department 
of Transportation.  
Cargo coming from an “Unknown” source could mistakenly represent a control 
group for this study since no specific vendor could be identified.  However, cargo coming 
from an Unknown source would have specific reasons for the frustration that directly 
relate to the vendor being undetermined.  Specifically, if the vendor is unknown often 
times this would mean that the shipping papers could not be found to identify what 
company sent the cargo.  The next section analyzes additional findings of the study and 
also compares data collected in this research to similar data collected by Ellison two 
years ago.  
This data is analyzed into a statistical model that could better understand the 
validity of this model.  A hypothesis test determined if vendors were most likely to have 
various reason for frustrated cargo or if the different vendors generally the same 
problems.  A null hypothesis was tested (Kaziska, 2006)  
H0:  Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are independent; versus the alternative 
Ha:  Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are not independent. 
 The results of this analysis conducted by Kaziska proved to be significant and the 
entire results are published in Appendix B. 
 
4.8 Additional Findings 
Previous research showed what the largest problems were for frustrated cargo in 
2004.  This research is reviewed and compared to the most current data available in this 
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study.  By comparing identical lengths of time from two different years, we can see if any 
differences exist.  Data Table 12  below is from Ellison’s research and shows what the 
most common reasons and frequency HAZMAT was frustrated at Dover AFB.  This data 
was collected from 1 June to 17 July 2004. 
 
Table 12. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 June - 17 July 2004 
 (Ellison, 2004) 
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 June through 17 July 2004 
Reasons  # Shipments % of Total 
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 29 40.28%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 20 27.78%
Incorrect Certification 9 12.50%
TCN 5 6.94%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 3 4.17%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight 3 4.17%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 3 4.17%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments 72 100.00%
 
These data are compared to the most current information provided by Dover AFB 
to see if differences exist.  The first of the following three tables looks at the data for a 
four month period.  Table 13 shows the most current data available and analyzes 
frustrated vendor HAZMAT from 1 August to 31 November 2005: 
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Table 13. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August – 31 November 2005 
(Eidson, 2006) 
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 31 November 2005 
Cause  # Shipments % of Total 
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 67 15.84%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 45 10.64%
Incorrect Certification 105 24.82%
TCN 191 45.15%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 2 0.47%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight 7 1.65%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 6 1.42%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments 423 100.00%
 
 
Table 13 above looks at the most current data compiled during a four month 
period.  Since the data in Ellison’s research looks at one and a half months of data or 46 
days, this four month data set is broken down into two separate groups looking at a 
identical lengths of time.  The following table breaks down the four month data set into a 
similar comparison from 1 August to 16 September 2005 or 46 days: 
 
Table 14. Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August - 16 September 2005  
(Eidson 2006) 
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 August through 16 September 2005 
Cause  # Shipments % of Total 
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 26 16.35%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 16 10.06%
Incorrect Certification 47 29.56%
TCN 60 37.74%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 1 0.63%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight 6 3.77%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 3 1.89%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments 159 100.00%
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A similar comparison is made for the same amount of time but with a different 
segment of data.  The following table breaks down the four month data set into a similar 
46 day comparison from 1 October to 16 November 2005. 
 
Table 15.  Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 October - 16 November 2005 
(Eidson 2006) 
Frustrated Vendor HAZMAT Shipments 1 October through 16 November 2005 
Cause  # Shipments % of Total 
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 27 15.52%
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 20 11.49%
Incorrect Certification 31 17.82%
TCN 92 52.87%
No 1502 Re-Icing, Frozen/Chilled 1 0.57%
Wrong Net Explosive Weight 1 0.57%
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 2 1.15%
Total Frustrated HAZMAT Shipments 174 100.00%
 
Comparing the total frustrated HAZMAT shipments in Table 14. and Table 15. to 
the data presented by Ellison in Table 12, the initial indication is that frustrated 
HAZMAT is a growing problem.  Comparing Table 12 to 14 shows a 121% increase in 
the total frustrated cargo.  Comparing Table 12 to 15, shows a 142% increase in the total 
frustrated cargo.  The explanation by the chief of customer service at Dover AFB once 
again offers the explanation that a surge occurs in the middle of October through 
November before going back down before the holidays. (Eidson, 2006) 
This would indicate that the fiscal year budget and the lack of timely TAC code 
updates are causing a strain on the Dover AFB transportation system which causes 
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frustration.  A complete set of data for the entire fiscal year would need to be compiled 
for a more accurate understanding and study of this potential problem.  Analyzing 
frustrated HAZMAT data from all 12 months would be the only way to confirm these 
findings and that data was not made available when requested since the detailed records 
provided have just been collected since 1 August through 31 November 2005.     
   Since HAZMAT requires such precise packaging, labeling and paperwork 
requirement, the lack of communication between everyone involved appears to be the 
leading cause of the delivery delay.  As the first research question indicated, no standard 
relationship or communication process exists between the vendor and the APOE.   The 
data collected at Dover AFB is not an Air Force requirement and they are compiling this 
data on their own.  Similar data at Charleston AFB is available but it is currently not 
compiled in a format that can be easily analyzed.  In either case, no one is standardizing 
the data between locations or scrutinizing the information in such a way so that vendors 
and depots could be looked at closer to see if an increasing trend or on going problem 
exists. 
In Chapter Three, the research looked at the current system that cargo delivery 
and communication is being conducted.  The units or users in deployed locations are 
ordering the cargo.  The vendor is sending the cargo to the APOE and the APOE is 
frustrating any cargo with problems or sending it back to the vendor to be fixed.  By 
looking at the cargo coming from these supply sources, a communication bridge can be 
created between the APOE and the supplier.  This bridge could be established and 
required by both the APOEs and the vendors who provide cargo.  Figure 4 below shows 
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this proposed communication bridge and represents a better alternative to the current 
system shown in Figure 2.  
 
Dover AFB
Forward Location
Charleston AFB
Depot Commercial VendorDepot
Commercial 
Vendor
Communication Flow
Cargo Flow
Air Mobility Supply Chain
 
Figure 4. Improved Air Mobility Supply Chain   
 
 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, over two dozen depots all over the country 
are sources of cargo that come through Dover and Charleston AFB.  (Eidson, 2006)  In 
the case of Dover AFB, these depots are major sources of cargo that support the channel 
missions destined for Baghdad, Iraq to support our troops.  When frustrated HAZMAT 
sourced from depots is compared to frustrated HAZMAT sourced from vendors, a drastic 
difference is observed.  Table 16 and 17 below shows the entire depot frustrated 
occurrences at Dover and Charleston AFB compared to all of the vendor frustrated 
occurrences at Dover AFB. 
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Table 16.  Percentage of Depot Frustrated Occurrences: Dover and Charleston AFB  
(Eidson 2006) 
Percentage of Depot Frustrated Occurrences: Dover and Charleston Air Force Base 
Reason Percent Number  
 Incorrect Certification 30.43% 28.00
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 29.35% 27.00
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 19.57% 18.00
Not Regulated 16.30% 15.00
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 4.35% 4.00
Total 100.00% 92.00
  
 
Table 17. Percentage of Vendor Frustrated Occurrences: Dover AFB  (Eidson 2006) 
Percentage of Vendor Frustrated Cargo Occurrences: Dover Air Force Base 
Reason Percent Number 
TCN 45.15% 191
Incorrect Certification 26.48% 112
No Shipping Papers/Declarations 15.84% 67
Miscellaneous (MSDS, Info, PSN, Markings, etc.) 11.11% 47
Packaging Incorrect or Damaged 1.42% 6
Total 100.00% 423
 
 
 With 45% of the frustrated HAZMAT being caused by TCN, a clear problem 
exists with TCN errors from vendors.  As mentioned before, this could be an incorrect 
TCN, a missing TCN or the TCN being used with the wrong cargo.   This is 191 pieces of 
frustrated HAZMAT in four months that could be avoided if the vendor could be 
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educated on how to use a TCN properly or know not to ship an item until a TCN has been 
established.     
 
4.9 Summary 
In summery, the research demonstrates many different approaches to analyzing 
problems that have no easy solutions.  The importance of resolving frustrated HAZMAT 
problems properly and as fast as possible could not be over emphasized.  However, the 
different variables and factors slowing down the delivery process are extremely complex.  
This analysis is not an attempt to highlight one cause of concern or emphasize any 
particular problem as the main hold up in the HAZMAT delivery process.  The emphasis 
of this research is to identify causes of concern and analyze the problem in a way that has 
not been looked at before.  Additionally, the research looked closely at some possible 
solutions that could be expanded on in the future.  Simply put, if we could get all of DoD 
vendors and APOEs communicating and working the delivery of HAZMAT the same 
way, the problems could be better defined and clearer solutions could be identified.  By 
highlighting many causes and sources of frustrated HAZMAT, further research can work 
toward fixing the problem areas.  The next chapter looks at some of these opportunities 
for further research, and makes final conclusions about this research effort.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview  
This chapter summarizes the research and analysis conducted in this thesis.  It 
answers the research question through the investigative questions and makes 
recommendations for action. Finally, suggestions for further research efforts are offered 
to better understand and improve the time delays of frustrated HAZMAT within the 
supply chain. 
5.2 Research Summary  
This research set out to answer the following question: What are the current 
reasons for frustrated cargo at Dover and Charleston AFBs and what improvements 
can be made to the HAZMAT delivery process that will allow cargo to move faster 
and cheaper on departing inter-theater aircraft? 
  Five investigative questions followed to fully address the different factors of this 
issue. To answer the main problem of this research, the following investigative questions 
have been formulated for this study.  What are the major differences between the 
Customer Service Operations at Dover and Charleston AFB and how do these differences 
affect the transport of HAZMAT?  What are common causes for depot HAZMAT 
frustrated cargo at Charleston and Dover AFB?  What is the average time delay for 
Depot HAZMAT frustrated cargo?  What trend is observed from the frustrated HAZMAT 
performance metric at Charleston AFB and Dover AFB?  What trends can be identified 
when cross referencing reasons for frustrated HAZMAT and the vendor who supplied the 
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cargo?  What reasons primarily cause HAZMAT to be frustrated?  What commercial 
vendors have the most occurrences of frustrated HAZMAT?  In addition to these 
investigative questions, this research also looked at how the current results compare to 
the data collected by Ellison in 2004.  Difference between current data and Ellison’s data 
are identified and where possible the causes are also identified. 
5.3 Findings  
 It appears that the greatest opportunity to improve the HAZMAT frustration 
delivery process is to continue to analyze and improve the existing process.  One of the 
greatest pieces of information that the researcher learned in the Air Force Institute of 
Technology Logistics Management Program is that the entire Supply Chain pipeline is 
never perfect and opportunities for improvement always exist.  The Customer Service 
Sections that manage the HAZMAT frustration problem are the only point of contact 
with the vendors and with the depot.  Each of these sections is working as separate 
organizations and representatives for their respective APOE.  Customer Service Section 
is practicing the best business practices as they see it and as they have determined it 
should be.   Just by looking at the different practice of fixing a frustrated piece of 
HAZMAT at one location verses sending it back to the vendor or depot at another can 
appear to be a small detail.  However, each one of these sections is making dramatic 
decisions that determine what everyone in the respective supply chain must assimilate 
too.  This one seemingly minor decision could determine how every vendor must adjust 
their standard requirements.  The unknowing soldier in the field would certainly know the 
difference based on how long it took to get their cargo.  
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Dover AFB had detailed records consisting of vendors that provided frustrated 
HAZMAT.  Although unanalyzed, this offered the researcher an opportunity to find out 
what vendors are most responsible for frustrated HAZMAT and had the most room for 
improvement.  This data only existed however, because of documentation that went 
above any standard requirement set by the Air Force.  The data that was collected was 
most useful for Investigative Question.  Investigative questions that showed comparisons 
to Ellisons research, trends in frustrated HAZMAT or numbers and percentages of 
frustrated items, have proven to be inconclusive in some cases, due to the wide gaps in 
cargo delivery numbers during the year.  Trends need to be compared for years at a time 
comparing the same months for each year.  This data should also be compared during 
times of national crisis and times of peace during periods when similar amounts of cargo 
are being processed.  Therefore, this portion of the research started an opportunity that 
could be continued so that more data could be collected and a better understanding of the 
problems could be achieved.   
HAZMAT packaging requirements are different for ground transportation versus 
the more restrictive air transportation.  If the Air Force and government could place more 
restrictive requirements on the vendors who ship by ground, HAZMAT could be 
delivered to the war fighter from the APOEs quicker and cheaper.   The vendors should 
not be allowed to do business with the Air Force and DoD organizations unless they 
comply with the very restrictive delivery and paper work requirements of air 
transportation.   Since HAZMAT is such a critical and restrictive item, a Department of 
Defense (DoD) issued HAZMAT certification could be required by all vendors before 
commerce is authorized.  This certification would require the proper training be in place 
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for vendors that wish to do business with the United States military and DoD.   This 
training could educate on paperwork requirements such as TCN and the GPC program.  
The current method that exists is in the form of a policy letter and appears to serve as an 
advisory letter.  No standard exists in the Air Force to determine the best business 
practice between APOEs.  The memorandum is not setting a standard or requirement for 
depots and commercial carriers to follow.  
 The Traffic Management Office (TMO) at each base has a list of 
certified/approved house hold goods transportation companies.  These companies have 
met the standard and are provided the expectations that must be met for them to continue 
serving the government house hold good moving requirement.  When violations to the 
newly established requirement are determined, they are documented and recorded.  This 
documentation provides input into a track record or score that becomes a service record 
or reputation for the vendor.  If the service record has too many violations, these 
companies can be suspended or permanently removed from the list.  The opportunity to 
do businesses with the US government should be a privilege.  If this standard already 
exists for moving military members during relocations, a similar standard Air Force wide 
should be in place for moving precious HAZMAT to the war fighters overseas.      
 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research  
Future research can take on a number of different directions.  The research can be 
duplicated to APOEs on the west coast such as Travis and McCord AFB and see if 
similar results exist.  The research could expect to see a number of different vendors and 
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different types of cargo.  If the communication problems exist between the suppliers and 
APOEs on the east coast, then it would be fairly safe to assume that this problem exists 
on the west coast as well.  
At each major APOE, Dover, Charleston, Travis and McCord, interviews and 
discussions with specifically flagged depots and vendors could be conducted.  This 
revolutionary communication bridge could be used to discuss opportunities for 
improvement directly with the source of our war fighting materials.  Since this research 
identified problems that exist, the vendors could be asked about potential for change to 
fix the repeated problems.  It could also open up an opportunity to receive input from the 
various suppliers.   For vendors who continue to not comply,  research could be done to 
see if alternative sources of the item can be found at a cheaper price.  If commercial 
vendors are identified as unable or unwilling to change the packaging, delivery method or 
price, a better source of supply could be found. 
As suggested in the previous section, a standard business practice and 
expectations could be established DoD wide.  Some measure or standard for expectations 
needs to be applied to all of the APOEs.  Having each aerial port conducting business 
how ever they see fit, is a wasted opportunity.  Each location could share what works and 
a standard could be established Air Force Wide.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 Our troops fighting in combat are useless without the proper tools to do their job.  
Businesses have learned decades ago how to maximize their profit through a stream lined 
supply chain management process.  They are using technology and innovative ways of 
61 
thinking to help move goods quicker and cheaper.  Fed Ex and UPS are innovative 
leaders in the transportation business.  The importance of our transportation mission 
should make that level of cargo delivery the absolute minimum standard.  DoD and Air 
Mobility Command should find ways to far exceed that standard.  The difference between 
our job and these major corporations is that we do not make a profit and no direct 
motivators for personal gain exist.  The lives we save or the wars we win are not readily 
apparent to the members responsible for moving this critical equipment.  Therefore, the 
maximized potential is not achieved. 
 The standard and requirements must start at the top.  Leadership must require our 
APOEs and vendors to learn from each other and implement a standard requirement for 
everyone to follow.  Only by standardizing the best solutions to the problem of 
HAZMAT cargo delivery, can the highest levels of capability be achieved.    
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 Appendix A: Acronyms 
 
Acronym Description 
ADUSD (TP) Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Transportation 
Policy  
AFMAN Air Force Manual 
AMC Air Mobility Command  
AMC-DDC- 
ACC IPT 
Air Mobility Command-Defense Distribution Center Air Cargo 
Consolidation Integrated Process Team  
APM Active Performance Management  
APOE Aerial Port of Embarkation  
APS Advanced Planning System 
CCN Carton Control Number  
CIO Chief Information Officer  
COP Common Operating Picture 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf  
DAA Designated Approval Authority  
DAASC Defense Automatic Addressing System Center  
DDC Defense Distribution Center  
DDRV Defense Distribution Depot Richmond Virginia  
DFWG Distribution Focused Working Group  
DITSCAP DoD Information Technology Certification and Accreditation 
Process  
DLA Defense Logistics Agency  
DODAAC DoD Activity Address Codes  
DoDAAF Defense Activity Address File  
DPO Distribution Process Owner 
DSCR Defense Supply Center Richmond  
DSS Distribution Standard System  
DVD Direct Vendor Delivery  
DVD IPT Direct Vendor Delivery Integrated Process Team  
EIDE Enterprise Integrated Data Environment  
EIS Executive Information System 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning Systems  
GATES Global Air Terminal Execution System  
GPC Government Purchase Cards  
GSA General Services Administration  
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
IATO Interim Approval to Operate  
IDE Integrated Data Environment  
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IPT Integrated Process Team 
Acronym Description 
ITV Intransit Visibility  
JCS Joint Chief of Staff  
JDPO Joint Deployment Process Owner  
JFCOM Joint Forces Command  
MOA Memorandum of Agreement  
MRO Material Requisition Order  
OCONUS Outside the Continental United States 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense  
SAMMS Standard Automated Material Management System  
SCEM Supply Chain Event Management  
SQL Standard Query Language 
SSAA System Security Authorization Agreement  
TCMD Transportation Control and Movement Document  
TCN Transportation Control Number  
TFM Trusted Facility Manuals  
USTC JDDA US Transportation Command Joint Deployment and Distribution 
Architecture  
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command  
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 Appendix II: Chi Square Analysis (Kaziska, 2006) 
      
 
  To perform a formal hypothesis test indicating whether various vendors tended to have 
different reasons resulting in distressed shipments, we performed a chi square test of 
independence.  We tested the null hypothesis  
 
H0:  Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are independent; versus the alternative 
Ha:  Vendor and reason for distressed shipment are not independent. 
 
We begin with a brief introduction to the chi square test.  A more detailed explanation is 
available in Box, Hunter, Hunter, Statistics for Experimenters, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
(1978), or on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/prc/section4/prc45.htm. 
 
The idea of the chi square test as implemented in this problem is that if the reasons for 
distressed shipments were independent of vendor, then the reasons would occur with 
approximately equal proportions for each vendor.  The test is conducted by constructing a 
table whose rows list the reasons for distressed shipments and whose columns list the 
vendors.  Then the (i, j)-th cell of the table indicated the number of time a distressed 
shipment occurred from the j-th vendor, with the i-th reason.   
 
The observed count Oij, in the (i, j)-th cell is compared to the expected number Eij.  The 
expected cell count in the (i, j)-th is  
 
N
CR
E jiij =       
 
where Ri is the total number of times the i-th reason occurred and Cj is the total number of 
distressed shipments by the j-th vendor.  The chi square test statistic is then 
 
      ∑ −=
ji ij
ijij
E
OE
,
2
2 )(χ                       (1) 
 
where Eij is the expected cell count in the (i, j)-th cell and Oij is the observed cell count in 
the (i, j)-th cell.  A large value of this test statistic indicates a large difference between the 
observed and expected cell counts, which gives evidence that the rows and column are 
not independent.  Under the null hypothesis, and statistical assumptions of a random 
sample, the test statistic has a chi square distribution with (r-1)(c-1) degrees of freedom, 
where r is the number of rows in the table and c is the number of columns in the table. 
 
This analysis was limited to the four most prolific shippers plus the packages whose 
shippers were unknown; and to the four most common reasons (1. No Shipping 
Papers/Declaration; 2. Miscellaneous; 3. Incorrect Certification; 4.  TCN).  Limiting the 
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hypothesis test to these shippers and these four reasons was necessary to get adequate 
sample size for this chi square test.  A table was constructed with these vendors in the 
columns and the reasons in the rows.  In each cell of the table, the number of times each 
vendor had a distressed shipment due to each reason is indicated.   The chi square test 
was conducted on this table of data.  Following is the table:  
 
  Vendors 
Reasons GSA UNKNOWN INSITU HONEYWELL CUMMINS
No Shipping 
Papers/Declarations 8 10 0 1 4 
Miscellaneous  9 3 0 0 0 
Incorrect Certification 16 4 23 0 2 
TCN 2 11 0 10 2 
 
 
The Minitab output indicating the result of this test is as follows: 
 
Chi-Square Test: GSA, Unknown, Institu, Honeywell, Cummins  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
Chi-Square contributions are printed below expected counts 
 
         GSA  Unknown  Institu  Honeywell  Cummins  Total 
    1      8       10        0          1        0     19 
        6.21     4.97     4.08       1.95     1.78 
       0.513    5.085    4.084      0.465    1.776 
 
    2      9        3        0          0        1     13 
        4.25     3.40     2.79       1.34     1.21 
       5.301    0.047    2.794      1.336    0.038 
 
    3     16        4       23          0        0     43 
       14.07    11.25     9.24       4.42     4.02 
       0.266    4.674   20.476      4.421    4.019 
 
    4      2       11        0         10        9     32 
       10.47     8.37     6.88       3.29     2.99 
       6.849    0.824    6.879     13.687   12.075 
 
Total     35       28       23         11       10    107 
 
Chi-Sq = 95.609, DF = 12, P-Value = 0.000 
13 cells with expected counts less than 5. 
 
The conclusion for the hypothesis test comes from the chi square test statistic of 95.609, 
which produces a level of significance of 0 (to three decimal places).  We reject the null 
hypothesis, and we have strong evidence that the vendor and the reason for distressed 
shipments are not independent. 
 
Furthermore, this output aids in interpretation of the data, giving an indication of why the 
two variable were found not to be independent.  In each cell, there are three numbers 
shown:  The actual cell count, the expected cell count, and the contribution of the cell to 
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the chi square statistic.  Large deviation between the actual and expected cell counts 
indicate that there is a large difference between the expected cell count and the actual 
count.  In this context, a large contribution to the chi square statistic means a large 
difference between the expected and observed cell count.   
For example, for the vendor Cummins and reason #4 (TCN), the three numbers shown 
are  
 
         9 
    2.99 
12.075 
 
The number 9 indicates the actual cell count, that is, 9 shipments from Cummins had 
problems with the TCN, as compared to the expected number of 2.99 in the second row.  
The number 12.075 is the contribution of this cell to the test statistic in Eq. (1).  This cell 
was the largest contributor to the test statistic so it had great impact in affecting the 
conclusion to the hypothesis test.  Additional interpretation of the large contributors to 
the chi square statistic can be undertaken to understand the dependence between the 
variables of vendor and reason.   
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